I began my review of volume 6 of the new critical edition by saying that from the three volumes published we could see how the editors planned to deal with almost all the problems that they faced. I shall not be tempted into any rash statement of this kind again; for it is clear that every volume brings its own special problems with it. The present volume contains the manuscript that Hegel wrote for a course on “Realphilosophie” which he probably (...) gave for the first time at Jena in the Winter Semester of 1805/6, and again in Summer 1806. This manuscript was first utilized by K. Michelet, who inserted copious quotations from the “Naturphilosophie” into the Zusätze for his edition of the Encyclopedia “Philosophy of Nature”. Michelet already knew fairly accurately what the provenance and date of the manuscript were. Modern studies have only made the dating a little more precise and altogether more secure. The whole manuscript was finally published by J. Hoffmeister in 1931. It has been known to us for the last forty-five years as Jenenser Realphilosophie II. (shrink)

F. H. Bradley was the foremost philosopher of the British Idealist school, which came to prominence in the second half of the nineteenth century and remained influential into the first half of the twentieth. Bradley, who was educated at Oxford, and spent his life as a fellow of Merton College, was influenced by Hegel, and also reacted against utilitarianism. He was recognised during his lifetime as one of the greatest intellectuals of his generation and was the first philosopher to receive (...) the Order of Merit, in 1924. In this major work, originally published in 1883, Bradley discusses the basic principles of logic: judgment and inference. He rejects the idea of a separation between mind and body, arguing that human thought cannot be separated from its worldly context. In the second edition, published in 1922 and reissued here, Bradley added a commentary and essays, but left the text largely unaltered. (shrink)

Early attempts at combining multiple inheritance with nonmonotonic reasoning were based on straightforward extensions of tree-structured inheritance systems, and were theoretically unsound. In The Mathcmat~'cs of Inheritance Systcrns, or TMOIS, Touretzky described two problems these systems cannot handle: reasoning in the presence of true but redundant assertions, and coping with ambiguity. TMOIS provided a definition and analysis of a theoretically sound multiple inheritance system, accom-.

Contributions in the concept of the divine; influence; Islamic philosophy.

The present work is intended once again to draw the attention of readers to the resources opened up by Spinoza for the elucidation of the classical problems of philosophy. Today these problems are too often taken to be merely verbal, so that answers to them so far as these are metaphysical are confidently claimed to be "nonsense. " My labours will, therefore, seem to minds thus committed to have been untimely and funda mentally futile. Untimely they may have been, but (...) unless also fu tile their untimeliness may render them the more exigent; and to judge them as futile is to claim a certainty not avaIlable to the honest sceptic. Vigorous attempts to discredit metaphysical investigation are no new thing, though the latest is, perhaps, the most thoroughgoing, and cer tainly the most self-confident. Yet it may well be argued that effective criticism of metaphysics is either itself a sort of metaphysics, or has for its foundation presuppositions that could only be metaphysically es tablished. "Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret. " Metaphysics survives, and can only survive as a true philosophia perennis, as the catalyst of scepsis and schism - neither as inexorabie dogma "once for all de livered," nor as "a plant that cometh of the lust of the earth, without a formal seed. (shrink)

Cynthia will leave Rome for the country: how fortunate that there will be no one there to seduce her—provided there is no visitor from the outside world! Propertius will himself go hunting. If Cynthia has any temptations, let her remember that in a few days he will be with her.

I have never read the two great stanzas of Odes III. 3 without a feeling that the above phrase was rather inadequate, according to what I suppose to be the accepted translation. I base the word ‘accepted’ on Forcellini, and Lewis and Short, who give the reference under the head of propositum, ‘purpose,’ ‘intention,’ ‘resolution,’ ‘design.’ But the capacity of sticking to some particular purpose is not a very noble quality, and if we take the phrase in the wider sense (...) of general tenacity of purpose, I do not feel that we get the ‘iustus’ of the ode, though we may perhaps get a person who is likely to succeed in life. Taken in this way, ‘tenax propositi’ suggests the portrait of Henry VIII., with his gross face and striding legs, dominating the English Church and the High Table of Trinity. I shall perhaps be told that the context shows the meaning. It may no doubt prevent the phrase from being misleading, but it does not make it worthy of its setting. I may add that in the other two places, where I know of its occurring, it has no very lofty meaning. In Ovid Met. X. 415, ‘propositi tenax’ is used to describe the persistent efforts of Myrrha's nurse to find out what is the matter. In Quintilian XI. 1, 90, in a discourse on mild equivalents, we are told that the ‘pertinax’ may be spoken of as ‘ultra modum propositi tenax.’. (shrink)